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BUILDING a DECISION AID 
RIGHT-SIDE OUT
Barry F. Anderson
Department of Psychology
Portland State University
The Thesis
• Decision aids are human-machine systems that, ideally,                 
(a) represent rationally the underlying logic of the           
problem, AND
(b) take into account the bounded rationality and the 
irrationality of the user’s mind.
• Decision aids that have been around the longest were 
built by professionals, for professionals.  They represent 
the underlying logic of the problem well but are not 
widely used.
• Some aids have been developed recently for the popular 
market but don’t score well on either criterion.  Wise
Decider is being developed with both criteria in mind.
• People often make important 
decisions badly.
• Some of the simplest features of 
decision analysis can improve 
decisions.
• People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?
Some of the Simplest 
Features of Decision Analysis 
Can Improve Decisions
Even low-tech decision analysis…
• Provides external memory
• Compares alternatives
• Considers outcomes
• Analyzes outcomes into attributes 
(decision tables)
• Analyzes outcomes into futures 
(decision trees)
• Separates facts from values
DA Provides External Memory I
For example, Japanese outperform other 
cultures in calculation by using or 
thinking in terms of abacuses.
Hatano, G.  (1982).  Learning to add and subtract: A Japanese 
perspective.  In T. P. Carpenter, J. Moser, M., & T. A. Romberg 
(Eds.), Addition and Subtraction: A cognitive perspective.  Hillsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.  P. 217.
DA Provides External Memory II
• A priori decomposition.  Decision analysis analyzes the 
problem into simpler components prior to judgment and 
then combines the analytic judgments mathematically. 
• A posteriori decomposition.  Statistical (bootstrap) 
models analyze, after the fact, judgments made 
holistically.
• Even a posteriori models outperform the decision 
makers on whose judgments those models are based,  
by providing external memory and removing the 
randomness from those judgments, thus “raising the 
decision makers by their own bootstraps.”  
Dawes, R. M.  (1979).  The robust beauty of improper linear models in decision 
making.  American Psychologist, 34, 571-582.
DA Provides External Memory III
Reisberg, D.  (1996).  The non-ambiguity of mental images.  In C. 
Cornold, R. Logie, M. Brandimonte, G. Kaufman, & D. Reisberg (Eds.), 
Stretching the Imagination: Representation and transformation in mental 
imagery.  NY: Oxford U. Press.
DA Requires Comparison of 
Alternatives I
Without comparison:
A 7/36 chance to win $9 is rated 9.4.
A 7/36 chance to win $9 and a 29/37 
chance to lose 5 cents is rated 14.4.
Slovic, P.  (1985).   Violations of dominance in rated attractiveness of playing 
bets.  Decision Research Report 85-6.  Eugene, OR: Decision Research.
DA Requires Comparison of 
Alternatives II
When a single case is evaluated, judgments 
of a rape victim’s responsibility are higher 
for a virgin than for a divorcee.
Birnbaum, M.  (1982).  Controversies in psychological measurement.  In B. Wegener 
(Ed.), Social Attitudes and Psychological Measurement.  Hillsdale, NJ:  Erlbaum.
Pp. 401-485.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T.  (1986).  Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.  
Psychological Review, 93, 136-153.
Hsee, C. K.  (1996). The evaluability hypothesis: An explanation of preference reversals 
between joint and separate evaluation of alternatives.  Organizational Behavior &  
Human Decision Processes, 46, 247-257. 
We tend to “throw good money after bad”, 
favoring alternatives for which we have 
already incurred substantial costs, even 
though these costs were incurred in the 
past and are thus necessarily the same 
for all alternatives.
DA Requires Comparison of 
Alternatives III
DA Considers Outcomes
Pass Fail Don’t 
Know
Buy vacation 54% 57% 32%
Not Buy 
Vacation
16% 12% 7%
Pay $5 to 
decide later
30% 31% 61%
Tversky, A., & Shafir, E.  (1992).  The disjunction effect in choice under 
uncertainty.  Psychological Science, 3, 305-309.
HOLISTIC vs. DECOMPOSED JUDGMENT
von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986, p. 364
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DA Analyzes Outcomes 
into Attributes I
Gardner, P. & Edwards, W.  (1975). Multiattribute utility measurement for social decision making.  In M. 
F. Kaplan & S. Schwarz (Eds.),  In M. F. Kaplan & S. Schwarz (Eds).  Human Judgment and 
Decision Processes.  NY: Academic Press.
DA Analyzes Outcomes 
into Attributes II
Superadditivity. Probabilities at an event 
node sum from slightly over 1.00 for 2 
events to around 3.00 for 16 events. 
Explanation.  Events not in attention seem 
to be underweighted. “Other” underweighted 
in fault tree. 
DA Analyzes Outcomes into 
Possible Futures (Correctly) 
DA Separates Facts from Values
(& permits distributed decision making)
Hammond, K. R., & Adelman, L. (1976). Science, values, and human 
judgment.  Science, 194, 389-396.
Conclusion
• The greatest net benefit may come from simple 
changes that represent more rationally the 
underlying logic of the problem without 
becoming so complex as to lose touch with the 
bounded rationality and the irrationality of the 
user’s mind.
• Overall Quality = Verisimilitude X Useability
“Better the half than the whole.”  
- Chinese proverb.
People often make important 
decisions badly.
Some of the simplest features of 
decision analysis can improve 
decisions.
• People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?
People Rarely Use 
Decision Analysis
Resistance to
Bootstrap Models
•Over 50 years of demonstrations of the superiority of 
bootstrap models to the judges they model have had almost 
no effect on the practice of human judgment!  Why?
•Models threaten egos and pocketbooks.
•Models are less politically impressive.
•Statistical evaluation reveals error, while intuitive evaluation 
conceals error.
Dawes, R. M.  (1979).  The robust beauty of improper linear models in 
decision making.  American Psychologist, 34, 571-582.
Resistance to 
Checklists in Medicine
In 2001, Peter Pronovost, an M. D. at 
Johns Hopkins, introduced a checklist for 
reducing infections when putting a line 
into a patient.  In the first two years of 
using the checklist, the 10-day line 
infection rate went from 11% to 0%; the 
number of deaths dropped by 8; and the 
costs dropped by $2,000,000.
Gawande, A.  (2007).  The Checklist.  The New Yorker.  
Dec. 10. Pp. 87-95.
Pronovost also introduced a checklist for 
caring for patients on mechanical 
ventilation.  In the first year, the 
percentage of patients who failed to 
receive the recommended care dropped 
from 70% to 4%; the occurrence of 
pneumonia fell by 25%; and 21 fewer 
patients died.
In the state of Michigan, a checklist saved 
1500 lives and $75,000,000 in the first 18 
months.
What was the reception?
•There were few additional takers.
•Some physicians were offended.
•Some doubted the evidence.
•Some said, “Forget the paperwork.  Take 
care of the patient.”
“What do you do for a living?”
“Study decision making.”
“Then you can help me.  I have some 
big decisions to make.”
“Well, actually....”
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein. S.  (1977).  Behavioral decision 
theory.  Annu. Rev. Psychol., 28, 1-39.
Resistance Among 
Decision Scientists
The National Science Foundation and the 
National Institutes of Health refused to use 
decomposed ratings for reviewing their 
proposals, although the changes were 
• Recommended by a leading decision 
researcher, 
• Well supported by research, and 
• Simple to implement.
Arkes, H. R.  (2003).  The nonuse of psychological research at two federal 
agencies.  Psychological Science, 14, 1-6.
Resistance 
at NSF and NIH
“We don’t want any criteria.”
“[This suggestion] causes less 
agreement and consensus than we 
would like around here.”
“No psychologist is going to tell 
me how to evaluate proposals.”
The responses?
A Personal Experience of 
Resistance Among Instructors
• Editors loved The 
Three Secrets.
• BUT marketing 
departments 
couldn’t find enough 
courses to justify 
financially the 
decision to publish.
A Resource-Allocation 
Perspective
The National Institutes of Health has a 
budget of $30,000,000,000 a year to fund 
medical discoveries. 
Yet work on using checklists in medicine 
has already saved more lives than that of 
any medical discovery in the past decade. 
Research on putting knowledge about 
decision making into practice should be 
similarly cost-effective.
People often make important 
decisions badly.
Some of the simplest features of 
decision analysis can improve 
decisions.
People rarely use decision analysis.
• Why, and what can be done?
Why and What Can Be Done?
Diagnosis of Causes of Problem
32
Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis
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Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis
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Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis
35
Causes for Resistance to Decision Analysis
Examples of
Behavioral Reasons
•Not thinking to use DA
•Insufficient skills to implement DA
•Insufficient motivation to implement DA.
•Insufficient authority to implement DA
Examples of 
Rational Reasons
•Diagnosticity. “It’s not likely to make any 
difference.” (overconfidence)
•Value of information. “The difference it 
makes isn’t likely to justify the costs.”
•Political externalities. “An improved 
decision would incur political costs.”
•Personal externalities. “An improved 
decision would incur personal costs.”
Enhanced Benefits Not Likely
to Be Seen as Justifying
Increased Costs to the DMer
Subjects with a decision aid did not use 
more information than subjects without 
one.  Effort is weighted more than 
accuracy, probably because feedback on 
effort is both more immediate and more 
tangible.
Todd, P. & Benbasat, I. (1992).  The use of information in decision making:  Investigation of the impact 
of computer-based decision aids.  MIS Quarterly, September.
Examples of 
Intuitive Reasons
•Cognitive position bias. “The answer 
is perfectly clear without any DA.” 
(E.g., availability, similarity.)
•Decision style bias. “That’s not the 
way I like to think about decisions.  
It’s difficult for me to have confidence 
in the results.”  (E.g., discussion, 
stories, reasons, images.)
Examples of 
Irrational Reasons
•Motivated position bias. “There’s no 
way I’m going to put my favored 
alternative at risk.”
•Motivated process bias. “There’s no 
way I’m going to yield any control over 
the decision process.”
Decision Training
May Not Be the Answer
Decision Training
May Not Be Very Effective
• High school students often can’t deal 
effectively with problems requiring abstract 
thinking.  Renner, J. W., & & Stafford, D. G.  (1972).  Teaching 
Science in the Secondary School.  NY: Harper & Row.
• As many as 50% of incoming college 
students operate below Piaget’s level of 
formal operations.  Gray, R. L.  (1979).  Toward observing 
that which is not directly observable.   In J. Lochhead & J. Clement (Eds.), 
Cognitive Process Instruction. Philadelphia: Franklin Instit. Press.  Pp. 217-
228.
GOFER
The Most Herculean Attempt Yet 
to Teach Decision Making
• Goals clarification, 
Option generation, 
Fact finding, 
Consideration of Effects, 
Review & Implementation
• 40-50 contact hours spaced over at least 1 year
• Basic Principles of Decision Making, Decision Making 
in Practice, 2 student workbooks, and a teachers’     
manual
• Two-four-day workshops sponsored by State Education 
Departments in Australia.
Mann, L., Harmoni, R., & Power, C.  (1991).  The GOFER course in decision making.  In J. Baron & R. V. Brown, 
Eds.  Teaching Decision Making to Adolescents.  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  Pp. 61-78
Evaluation of GOFER
• Improved confidence in decision making.
• Improved verbal knowledge of the course 
material.
• Yet no difference on any of the G, O, F, E, 
or R steps in decision making.
Beyth-Marom, R., & Fischhoff, B.  (1991).  Teaching decision making to adolescents:  A critical review.  In J. 
Baron & R. V. Brown, Eds.  Teaching Decision Making to Adolescents.  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.  Pp. 34.
Independence of Verbal Knowledge 
and Performance
In four tasks and two studies, practice improved only utilization of the 
correct rule, and explanation improved only the ability to articulate 
the correct rule.
• Study 1.  Maximize sugar production by changing number of 
workers; achieve a target social response by changing social 
behavior.
Berry, D. C., & Broadbent, D. E.  (1984).  On the relationship between task performance and 
associated verbalizable knowledge.  Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 36A, 209-291.
• Study 2.  Maximize bus riders by changing spacing between buses 
and parking fees; achieve a target social response by changing 
social behavior; determine optimal level of taxation conditional on 
level of employment and inflation.
Broadbent, D. E., Fitzgerald, P., & Broadbent, M. H. P.  (1986)  Implicity and explicit knowledge in 
the control of complex systems.  British Journal of Psychology, 77, 33-50.
Decision Aids
May Be the Answer
“The unassisted hand and the 
understanding left to itself possess but 
little power.  Effects are produced by the 
means of instruments and helps, which the 
understanding requires no less than the 
hand….”
Sir Francis Bacon
Novum Organum, 1620, 
First Book, Aphorism 2
An Overview of Three Decision 
Aids
•Expert Choice (sound)
•Let Simon Decide (appealing)
•Wise Decider (sound & appealing)
Expert Choice’s Opening Screen
Let Simon Decide’s Opening Screen
Wise D’s Opening Screen
Well, hello!
You must have a 
decision to make.
EC’s First Page
EC’s Second Page
LSD’s First Page
LSD’s Second Page
WD’s First Page
WD’s Second Page
EC’s Results I
EC’s Results II
EC’s Results III
LSD’s Results
WD’s Results
In the future:  
Commensurated table colors
1. One-sentence justification
2. Uncertainties to monitor
A Closer Look at Wise Decider
•Forget to (S)
Cup, spell checker, voice recognition
•Forget how to (R)
Guides, embedded training
•Not motivated  (+)
Response counters, social reinforcement
Behavioral
•Decision Path
•Documentation
Rational
•Discussion, warning signs
•Externalization
•Observer perspective
•Process orientation
•Testability
•Publicity test
•Completeness  & dominance tests
Irrational
•Advisors
•Intuitive start
•Colors & Moveable rows and columns
•Instructions in external memory
•Instructions in small steps
•Completeness & dominance checks
•[Hidden math model]
•Intuitive check & justification
Intuitive
Three Approaches to Uncertainty
• Expert Choice
• Let Simon Decide
• Wise Decider
Expert Choice’s
Treatment of Uncertainty
Let Simon Decide’s
Treatment of Uncertainty


WD’s Treatment of Uncertainty
Identifying & Representing 
Uncertainty I
• Identifying uncertainty. Which alternative 
is the riskiest?  Which estimates of impact 
are the least certain?  If this decision turns 
out badly, what’s the most likely reason it 
will have turned out badly? 
Identifying & Representing 
Uncertainty IIa
• For any cell where there is significant uncertainty, enter a range of values rather than 
a single value. For example, instead of entering a salary of $50,000 when you aren't 
at all certain that that will be the salary, you might enter the range $40,000-
$60,000. Make the range broad enough that you feel there's a 99% chance that the 
actual value will turn out to be between the high and low ends of your range. A 
common human failing is to be overconfident in making predictions and to set ranges 
of uncertainty that are too narrow.
• For any cell where there is significant uncertainty, enter a range of values rather than 
a single value. For example, instead of entering a salary of $50,000 when you aren't 
at all certain that that will be the salary, you might enter the range $40,000-
$60,000. Make the range broad enough that you feel there's a 99% chance that the 
actual value will turn out to be between the high and low ends of your range.
• We’re really not very good at judging probabilities. For one thing, we tend to think the 
future will be much like the past and, as a consequence, often encounter surprises 
that we haven’t adequately prepared for. For example, when we judge a 99% 
confidence interval, only 1% of the cases should fall outside that interval; instead the 
figure can approach 50% (Alpert & Raiffa, 1982). That’s a lot of surprises! This is 
why Wise Decider emphasizes uncertainty proofing, which doesn’t require thinking 
about probabilities. When you do have to think about probabilities, however, the 
following guidelines can improve your judgments.
Identifying & Representing 
Uncertainty IIb
• Testability. Start with a testable, preferably quantitative, description of the outcome, e.g., “inches of rainfall in a 
24-hour period”, rather than just “rain” (Spetzler & von Holstein, 1975).
• Statistics. Start with objective statistics, when possible. For example, when thinking about how long a marriage 
might survive, start with statistics for the general population. We tend to have more confidence than we should in 
vivid examples about what we know about the particular case (here, the particular couple) than in abstract 
statistics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), but we should resist this tendency, since the statistics are based on more 
cases and are more reliable.
• Adjustment. You can then adjust these statistics to take into account what you know about the case at hand, but 
keep in mind that what you know about any particular case is rarely all that informative and rarely justifies much 
adjustment. To correct the tendency to set ranges of uncertainty that are too narrow, push the upper and lower 
limits out to where they feel uncomfortable. If you’re judging a 99% confidence interval for how long a marriage 
will last, the low end of the range should usually be so low that you feel uncomfortable about it, and the high end of 
the range should usually be so high that you feel uncomfortable about. It can help to try to think of specific causes 
or scenarios that might result in an extremely high value and specific causes or scenarios that might result in an 
extremely low value. (Fischhoff, 1982).
• Frequencies. We think better in terms of frequencies, rather than percentages or probabilities (Gigerenzer, 
1991). Imagine that you have an urn with 99 white balls and 1 black ball, and ask yourself, Is it more likely that the 
event (e.g., the marriage ends after 6 months) will occur or that you’d draw a black ball from this urn? If it’s more 
likely that the event will occur, Is it more likely that you’d draw a black ball from an urn with 50 white balls and 50 
black balls? On the other hand, if it’s more likely that you’d draw a black ball from the original urn with 99 white 
balls and 1 black ball, change the question to, Is it more likely that you’d draw a black ball from an urn with 999 
white balls and 1 black balls. By asjusting up and down in this way, you should be able to arrive at an urn where 
you’re unable to say whether it’s more likely that you’d draw a black ball from that urn or that the event would 
occur.
• The availability trap. We tend to judge events that are more available to memory as more probable (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979). Certainly, events that occur often are easier to remember, but so also are events that have 
occurred recently or are vivid. People tend to be reluctant to fly shortly after an airlines hijacking, even though the 
probability of a hijacking may actually be reduced for a time while people are more alert. When you’re judging a 
probability, consider whether recent and/or vivid events might be biasing your judgment.
Identifying & Representing 
Uncertainty III
• Coloring ranges. The color appropriate for an uncertain 
cell will, of course, be between that for the best end of 
the range and that for the worst end of the range. 
Specifically, (a) if you're risk neutral, the color for an 
uncertain cell will be the color appropriate for the long-
run average value that would be expected if the decision 
were to be repeated many times; OR (b) if you're risk 
averse, as most people usually are, the color for the cell 
will be a lower (darker) color than that. If, in the unlikely 
case that you're risk prone, the color for the cell will be a 
higher (lighter) color.
“Uncertainty Proofing”
• Control
• Get information
• Wait for information
• Diversify
• Share risk
Adding Mathematics to 
Wise Decider
• Problem structuring:  Identification of 
redundancy & irrelevance
• Choice: Identification of dominance 
• Conflict resolution:  Identification of winning 
trades
• Uncertainty:  Sensitivity analysis to guide 
uncertainty proofing
• [Probability trees?   (a) Identify positively 
correlated uncertainties and mediating event, 
(b) split row, (b) request probabilities?]
• Justification:  Identification of sufficient reasons
